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Executive orders extending back to 1981 direct regulatory agen-
cies to perform cost-benefit analyses of major regulations,' and to
comply with the analyses when not barred by statute, as is usually the
case. 2 Indeed, some statutes require cost-benefit analysis, and courts
increasingly have demanded it even when the statutes are vague.3 Yet,
though agencies issue cost-benefit analyses more frequently than in
the past, and though their analyses tend to be more sophisticated,
there is no evidence that regulatory performance has improved since
1981.4
One hypothesis for the lack of regulatory improvement is that the
executive orders do not contain effective enforcement mechanisms.
The regulatory process gives agencies the power to set the agenda,
and institutional specialization gives agencies superior information
about the effects of regulations. As a result, agencies can, in effect,
make take-it-or-leave-it offers to the President (really, the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB)). Agencies thus can formulate regu-
lations so that they are better, from the OMB's perspective, than the
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4 For a summary of some of the empirical work on this point, see Robert W. Hahn
& Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and
Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489; for further empirical information,
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status quo, while being biased in favor of the agencies' regulatory
goals, rather than the requirements of cost-benefit analysis. The OMB
cannot punish the agency without undermining the President's own
political goals. And although legislation and judicial enforcement can
improve agencies' incentives, legislators and judges are also vulner-
able to the agencies' strategic and informational advantages.
If this portrait is accurate, supporters of cost-benefit analysis need
to give greater attention to enforcement issues than they have in the
past.' In this Article, I sketch out a mechanism for increasing agency
incentives to comply with cost-benefit principles, so that agencies are
more likely to issue cost-justified regulation, rather than reporting
cost-benefit analyses while in fact ignoring the results, or complying by
providing shoddy cost-benefit analyses designed to rationalize the
agency's behavior. The proposed mechanism is, at this point, not fully
worked out, but rather is intended as a thought experiment to pro-
voke further discussion. 6
Under my proposal, agencies would be given what I will call "Net
Benefit Accounts" (NBAs). These are budget-like devices for account-
ing for the benefits and costs that regulations produce over time: the
benefit of every regulation would take the form of an addition to the
agency's NBA, and the cost would take the form of a subtraction.
Agencies would be required to keep positive balances in their NBAs.
Agencies with large surpluses in their NBAs would be permitted to
draw down a portion of the surplus for the purpose of issuing cost-
unjustified regulations for which the agency has a strong preference.
The NBA idea is not entirely new. It shares some of the character-
istics of the "regulatory budget," an idea that has been knocked about
5 The recent literature focuses on theoretical questions like the consistency of
cost-benefit analysis with normative principles, and on the ways to bring such analysis
in line with these principles. See, e.g., COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND
PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES 1-4 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001)
(compiling papers from a recent cost-benefit analysis conference and suggesting that
research regarding the normative justifications for cost-benefit analysis is a possible
direction for future research); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-
Benefit Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 168 (1999) (defending the use of cost-benefit analy-
sis and arguing that its use is "consistent with a broad array of popular theories of the
proper role of government").
I assume throughout this Article that cost-benefit analysis is a desirable decision
procedure. The proposal that follows can be attractive only on that assumption, al-
though, as I explain below, it can be designed to give agencies needed flexibility when
cost-benefit analysis falls short because of the difficulty of monetizing benefits. Infra
text accompanying note 22.
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in the literature for more than twenty years. Under the regulatory
budget proposal, agencies would not be able to issue regulations that
in the aggregate impose costs on regulated entities greater than a ceil-
ing enacted periodically by Congress. The regulatory budget system
does not reflect the benefits generated by any particular regulation.
By contrast, the NBA reflects both the benefits and the costs of each
particular regulation."
NBAs have, in the best case, two advantages over the status quo.
First, they serve an auditing function: they aggregate information
about agencies' regulatory activities in a way that facilitates monitor-
ing by elected officials and commentators. The aggregation of infor-
mation distinguishes the NBAs' auditing function from that of ordi-
nary cost-benefit analysis as it is used in the status quo. Second, NBAs
potentially improve the incentives of agencies to comply with cost-
benefit analyses by rewarding them when they issue "socially valuable"
regulations.9 The current enforcement system, by contrast, depends
not on systematic incentives, but rather on ad hoc intervention by the
political branches when an agency's regulation fails cost-benefit analy-
sis.
7 See, e.g., ROBERT E. LITAN & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, REFORMING FEDERAL
REGULATION 133-58 (1983) (considering the elements and issues involved in institut-
ing a regulatory budget); Christopher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatoy Costs-Part I:
The White House Review Programs, REGULATION, Jan./Feb. 1980, at 13, 15-18 (consider-
ing regulation review programs that have included cost-analysis requirements); Chris-
topher C. DeMuth, Constraining Regulatory Costs-Part II: The Regulatory Budget,
REGULATION, Mar./Apr. 1980, at 29, 30-31 [hereinafter DeMuth, Regulatory I]] (detail-
ing how a regulatory budget would work); Lance D. Wood et al., Restraining the Regula-
tors: Legal Perspectives on a Regulatory Budget for Federal Agencies, 18 -ARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1
(1981) (considering features and problems involved with potential regulatory budget
legislation). The idea apparently originated within the government's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors. LESTER B. LAvE, THE STRATEGY OF SOCIAL REGULATION: DECISION
FRAMEWORKS FOR POLICY 21 (1981). It has not been formally adopted by the govern-
ment, perhaps because of the many difficulties of implementation or perhaps just be-
cause it is not an attractive idea, infra Part III.D. For a recent endorsement of the idea,
seeJohn D. Graham, Legislative Approaches to Achieving More Protection Against Risk at Less
Cost, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 13, 41-56, which encourages Congress to pass a risk regula-
tion statute sharing some characteristics of the regulatory budget system. The possibil-
ity of taking benefits into account, which would make the regulatory budget somewhat
closer to the NBA system, is discussed but rejected by DeMuth, Regulatory II, supra, at
31-32.
8 For a discussion of the differences in greater detail, see infra Part III.D.
9 By "socially valuable" regulations I mean regulations that pass cost-benefit analy-
sis (and, indeed, maximize the surplus of benefit over cost) when there are no non-
monetizable benefits, and that produce total benefits greater than costs when there are
nonmonetizable benefits. This is a simplification, but it is one that keeps the discus-
sion manageable.
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The NBA system is, however, not a panacea. It would entail sig-
nificant implementation problems, similar to those that afflict the
regulatory budget proposal.' But given the potential advantages of
the NBA system, and given the fact that the system is different enough
from regulatory budgets to warrant separate consideration, I believe
that NBAs could contribute to both cost-benefit scholarship and prac-
tice.
I. THE PROBLEM
I will assume that agencies conceive of themselves as having a
"mission"-to protect the environment, to help farmers, to ensure
that drugs are safe and effective, and so forth." In formal terms,
agencies have preferences for policy outcomes that are generally more
interventionist than those of the median voter or elected official. By
contrast, some commentators assume that the preferences of agencies
are determined by industries or groups that "capture" them, or by the
political ambitions of the officials appointed to head them; or, con-
versely, by some general conception of the public interest." Although
all these factors clearly play a role-and there are agencies that do
seem to be controlled by political appointees, such as the early
Reagan-era EPA-I will stick to my simpler assumption.
If my assumption is correct, then it seems clear that when the EPA
(for example) evaluates potential regulations, its conclusions will
sometimes violate the results of a cost-benefit analysis. Put most sim-
ply, EPA officials will value some environmental amenity like clean air
more than citizens do, as determined by studies of health benefits and
the like. As a result, the EPA will want to regulate at a higher level
than that which would be justified by a cost-benefit analysis. To ra-
tionalize the regulation, the EPA will be tempted to appeal to non-
monetizable benefits excluded from the cost-benefit analysis by stan-
dard practice, or to argue that the cost estimates used in the cost-
benefit analysis are exaggerated.
A president or Congress that has the political will could punish
13
agencies that issue cost-unjustified regulations. Agencies enjoy stra-
10 See infra Part III (discussing the complications of the NBA proposal).
11 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 95-96 (1989) (discussing organizational
missions within the context of organizational culture).
12 For a survey, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation: Incorporating the Admin-
istrativeProcess, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 1 (1998).
1I assume throughout that elected officials seek "socially valuable" regulations.
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tegic advantages over these actors, however. Agencies have a first-
mover advantage. They look for problems, and they are generally the
first to propose a regulation. The President and/or Congress can re-
verse, or interfere with, a proposed regulation ex post, but the agency
generally will craft a proposed regulation so as to make elected offi-
cials slightly more than indifferent between implementation and
nonimplementation (and years more of delay). Regulations will,
then, tend to fall short of optimality, though perhaps not as much as if
no cost-benefit analysis were performed and the agencies were com-
pletely autonomous.
4
II. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: NET BENEFIT ACCOUNTS
As a partial solution to these problems, I propose that each agency
be given a Net Benefit Account. An NBA is an account that holds fic-
tive dollars to which a regulation's social benefits are added and from
which its social costs are subtracted. The NBA system is designed to
force agencies to internalize (in a political, rather than financial,
sense) the benefits and costs imposed by their regulations on industry
and other groups.
Let me start with an example. Suppose that an agency has a cer-
tain mission to do X (protect the environment, enhance food safety,
etc.). Congress gives the agency two separate budgets. 5  The first
budget covers its ordinary operating expenses, such as the cost of of-
fice space and salaries for employees. This budget consists of actual
dollars, to be used to pay these expenses. The second budget goes
into an NBA. This budget consists of fictive dollars. For simplicity, let
this amount be 100.
Under current executive orders, an agency performs a cost-benefit
analysis whenever it issues a major regulation. Under the NBA system,
the agency's own cost-benefit analysis is audited, either by a separate
government agency like the General Accounting Office (GAO) or Of-
fice of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), or by a private ac-
counting firm.'6 The audit verifies that the agency has followed good
14 The full story is more complex; for details, see Posner, supra note 4, at 1163-79,
which examines the political conditions under which agencies regulate.
5 1 will note, but will not discuss here, that the NBA system could be promulgated
by executive order or by legislation. Each possibility poses many legal complications,
which are best left for future work. Some of the questions would be similar to those
raised by the regulatory budget; for a good discussion of such questions, see Wood et
al., supra note 7, at 13-26.
The GAO already performs such audits, but only from time to time and not sys-
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practices, such as relying on peer-reviewed studies and using consis-
tent assumptions when calculating the impact of regulations. This
audit, through its reliance on crude, bright-line rules, would permit
only an approximation of the true social value of the regulation, just
as audits of business firms permit only an approximation of the firms'
financial health. If the regulation passes the audit, the agency's fig-
ures would be used for NBA calculations. If not, the auditor would ei-
ther ask the agency to revise its figures or the auditor would substitute
its own figures for those of the agency in NBA calculations.'7
Let's suppose the first hypothetical regulation produces benefits
of 40 and costs of 30 over one year (at which point it expires). This
means that it produces a net benefit of 10, over one year. When the
agency issues the regulation, 10 is added to the NBA, and its balance
increases to 110. If a subsequent regulation produces a net benefit of
-20, then promulgation of that regulation reduces the balance of the
NBA from 110 to 90.
Under the NBA system, the agency is permitted to keep issuing
regulations of any kind until the NBA reaches 0. At that point, it will
be forbidden to issue any negative net benefit regulations; it can now
issue only positive net benefit regulations. When it does so, the bal-
ance in the NBA rises back above 0.
The NBA keeps a record of the agency's net cost-benefit effect on
society, excluding the agency's operating expenses (and also the
nonmonetizable effects of the regulation). In this sense it is simply an
accounting mechanism. An analogy to the business world might be help-
ful here. Businesses, like agencies, evaluate projects. Businesses,
more so than agencies, use basic cost-benefit principles when they
make these valuations-the business jargon is "net present value." But
tematically. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, CLEAN WATER ACT: PROPOSED
REviSIONS TO EPA REGULATIONS TO CLEAN UP POLLUTED WATERS, GAO/RCED-00-
206R (2000) (reviewing EPA's economic analysis of proposed clean water regulations).
Such independent auditing would address the problem of shoddy cost-benefit analyses.
Placing auditing authority in the legislative branch might create constitutional difficul-
ties if the audit triggers an executive action. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726
(1986) (citing separation-of-powers concerns in holding that Congress cannot inter-
fere with the execution of the laws by reserving "for itself the power of removal of an
officer charged with the execution of the laws"). If these difficulties cannot be circum-
vented, the authority would have to be given to an executive branch agency such as the
OMB, or possibly a private agency. I thank Elena Kagan for bringing this problem to
my attention.
17 If, as seems likely, the audit would take a great deal of time, the agency's origi-
nal figures could be used for NBA purposes and then retroactively adjusted as neces-
sary after completion of the audit.
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shareholders, creditors, and other interested parties do not usually
evaluate a particular firm on a project-by-project basis, insisting that
every project have positive net present value. They understand that
projects involve risk, that they usually involve costs and benefits that
cannot be monetized reliably, and that it often makes sense to allow
managers to rely on intuition. Rather than evaluating each project
individually, observers look at the aggregate results: the amount of
revenues produced, say, in a year or other appropriate period, minus
costs, with the necessary adjustments-in other words, profits. The
balance in their NBAs would be for agencies what profits are for firms:
a reasonable, albeit crude, measure of success.
There is, however, an important difference between business ac-
counting and agency accounting. A business pays for projects out of
its own funds, and replenishes these funds with revenues from the
projects, so that the balance sheet reflects something real-a predic-
tion about whether the business will be able to continue to operate.
An agency, by contrast, does not incur the (nonoperating) costs of its
projects, and indeed does not usually obtain revenues to pay for those
costs. As a result, the agency's NBA is not a prediction about whether
the agency will be able to continue to operate. The agency will cease
to operate only if political actors, provoked by a negative NBA, step in
and shut it down.
The NBA, then, is at base an accounting mechanism, designed to
enable elected officials to monitor agencies just as accounting state-
ments enable investors and creditors to monitor businesses. The NBA
system would make agencies' regulatory performances easier to evalu-
ate and compare than they are under the current system, in which
cost-benefit analyses are prepared for each major regulation but no
aggregation across regulations occurs. If elected officials do not like
what they see, they can (in theory) punish agencies by reducing their
budgets, curtailing their jurisdiction, and subjecting them to greater
oversight.
Through the introduction of an enforcement mechanism, the
NBA system could be used more ambitiously as a device for altering the
payoffs of agencies. One simple enforcement mechanism would be a law
forbidding agencies to issue regulations that would reduce their NBA
below 0. The law might create a right of action, so that parties who
oppose the regulation would be able to obtain an injunction from a
court. This is the "stick."
The "carrot" is the agency's right to use the surplus in its NBA (or
a portion thereof) to "fund" regulations that are not cost-justified, but
14792002]
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are close to the agency's mission-what I will call "mission-sensitive"
regulations. Currently, an agency that issues a regulation with a large
net benefit obtains no greater reward than it receives when it issues a
regulation with a small net benefit. In both cases it simply avoids
whatever sanction, if any, would be attached to the failing of the cost-
benefit test. The NBA system, by contrast, offers an incentive for issu-
ing higher net benefit regulation; the size of the reward is an increas-
ing function of the net benefit of a regulation. An excellent regula-
tion increases the NBA balance more than a marginal regulation does.
Thus, the agency that issues an excellent regulation will have the free-
dom in the future to issue a mission-sensitive, but cost-unjustified
regulation; the agency that issues marginal or negative net benefit
regulations will not.
Of course, a highly mission-centered agency will likely take away
what it gives. If it builds up a large surplus at time 1, it will draw down
that surplus at time 2 as it pursues mission-sensitive regulations; the
net social effect will be zero. But since we want agencies to produce
greater social benefits than this, we need one more element: we need
to force the agency to "share" the surplus it generates with the public.
The most direct way of doing this is to tax the agency's NBA. If an
agency issues a regulation with net benefits of 100, let 40 go into the
account. Even if the agency draws down the account, it still has pro-
duced 60 for society. Taxation could also take place informally, with
Congress rewarding agencies periodically on the basis of their NBA
performance. Congress could reward agencies by allowing them to
retain a larger rather than smaller portion of their NBA balance.' 8
Let us look at an example. Compare a proposed regulation A,
which produces benefits of 100 and costs of 90, to regulation B, which
produces benefits of 30 and costs of 10. Assuming, as I have, that the
agency's preferences cause it to focus on the magnitude of benefits
and to discount costs, an agency constrained by resources to choose
only one regulation will prefer A to B. Although the agency is re-
quired to choose B rather than A under current executive orders, the
18 This is roughly the same thing that occurs when Congress punishes bad agen-
cies by subjecting them to enhanced oversight, including hearings, and rewards good
agencies by refraining from such harassment. Despite the fact that the agency would
be permitted to retain some of the surplus, the potential gains are high. See Tammy 0.
Tengs & John D. Graham, The Opportunity Costs of Haphazard Social Investments in Life-
Saving, in RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED: GETTING BETTER RESULTS FROM
REGULATION 167, 179 (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1996) (stating that if agencies only im-
plement regulations with cost-effectiveness ratios below some threshold, the life-saving
potential of regulations would double).
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agency potentially can exploit its bargaining power and opt for A
rather than B.'9 The NBA system would improve the agency's incen-
tives. Assuming a tax rate of 50%, B would increase the NBA from,
say, 0 to 10; A only from 0 to 5. With the higher NBA, the agency sub-
sequently could issue regulation Z, which has benefits of 200 but costs
of 206. The NBA system generates net social gains of 14 (counting
both regulation B and Z); the cost-benefit system, on the other hand,
generates net social gains of only 10 (counting regulation A alone).
As this example shows, the NBA improves on the status quo by
enabling agencies to bank regulatory benefits and then use them to
fund mission-sensitive regulations when the opportunity for them sub-
sequently arises. The ability to bank regulatory benefits is valuable
because regulatory opportunities are not continuous. Just as a busi-
ness maintains cash on hand or a line of credit so that it can seize
business opportunities as they arise, so would a regulatory agency want
to build up an NBA surplus in order to have the capacity to seize fu-
ture regulatory opportunities as they arise.
Although the above example alluded to NBA taxation, it is possi-
ble that Congress would not have to tax NBAs or directly reward or
punish agencies on the basis of their NBAs. Instead, an agency's NBA
would become a politically salient measure of an agency's perform-
ance.2° Agency heads who leave an agency with a high NBA would re-
ceive praise from the press and elected officials,just as the Federal Re-
serve chief does when the economy does well and inflation stays in
control. Even if agency heads would prefer to deplete NBA accounts,
agency staffs might resist efforts by agency heads to draw down their
NBAs on politically expedient projects: staffs might become jealous
guardians of their agencies' NBAs as a measure of the quality of the
agency. One could imagine agencies competing for the highest NBA,
which would introduce an element of competition to the bureaucracy.
In this way, the NBA could subtly change the agency's sense of mis-
sion, bringing the agency's regulatory preferences more closely in line
with those of the public and elected officials, who place as much
19 See supra Part I (discussing agencies' strategic advantages under the current
regulatory system). Again, the current problem is not that cost-benefit analysis pro-
duces wrong results (such as not being able to distinguish between A and B); it is that it
is hard to enforce because of the agency's superior information and bargaining power.
A president who prefers A to the status quo will find it difficult to interfere with the
regulation, especially if the agency can make a plausible claim that A produces addi-
tional nonmonetizable benefits.
20 This was one of the rationales for the regulatory budget. LITAN & NORDHAUS,
supra note 7, at 4.
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weight on cost as on benefit.
Some readers will make the following objection: Why should we
ever permit agencies to issue a net negative benefit regulation, as
might occur if an agency starts with an NBA balance greater than zero,
or builds up a balance with net positive benefit regulations? Why not
interfere whenever an agency proposes a socially costly regulation?
To see the force of this objection, imagine that an agency starts out by
issuing a highly beneficial regulation, which increases its balance from
(say) 10 million to 110 million. In theory, the agency could follow up
this success with a highly inefficient but ideologically or politically at-
tractive regulation that produces net costs of 110 million (or an
amount equal to the after tax balance of the NBA).
Much better, one might argue, would be to congratulate the
agency for the first regulation and then prohibit the second. The
problem with this argument is that it assumes that elected officials al-
ready control agencies perfectly. The proper comparison is between
the status quo-in which agencies report (frequently imperfect) cost-
benefit analyses but do not comply with them consistently-and the
NBA system. The failure of the existing system is due, in part, to the
agency's superior information and bargaining power. Principal-agent
theory teaches that in these circumstances some efficiency can be lost
when agents have information advantages, and mechanisms designed
to enhance performance often will do so by giving some of the "sur-
plus" to the agent." In business, monetary incentives are used to ex-
tract effort from agents: wages and benefits are made a function of
output. In government, monetary incentives are constrained, and the
NBA system-unlike the current system established by the cost-benefit
executive orders-instead holds out a political or ideological incentive
for good behavior. Under the current quasi-enforced cost-benefit sys-
tem, agencies continue to have incentives to bias regulation in the di-
rection of their own preferences; under the NBA system, agencies'
ability to do this would be diminished though not eliminated, and
would also be made more transparent to elected officials and the pub-
lic. In other words, the NBA system would formalize what is currently
a surreptitious, haphazard practice, thus legitimating mission-sensitive
regulation, but also improving agencies' incentives.
A final point to consider is that the NBA system would give agen-
21 For an introductory discussion, with citations, on the implications of the princi-
pal-agent theory, see Eric A. Posner, Agency Models in Law and Economics, in CHICAGO
LECrUREs IN LAW AND ECONOMIcs 225, 225-29 (Eric A. Posner ed., 2000).
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cies needed flexibility. If Congress believes that regulation of a par-
ticular industry will produce unusually large nonmonetizable bene-
fits,22 then it could give the relevant agency a large initial NBA ac-
count-say, 200 rather than 100. Similarly, if Congress or the
President trusts one agency more than the other-as will occur when
the agency's mission is relatively closely aligned with current political
preferences23-they can give that agency a larger account. The NBA
system is of particular value here because, in contrast to a "good rea-
son" requirement for deviating from ordinary cost-benefit analysis, the
NBA system gives Congress both the means of controlling the amount
of flexibility to be given to various agencies, and also the means to
track how frequently agencies take advantage of the flexibility given to
them.24
To sum up, while the NBA is mainly an accounting device, useful
for keeping track of the costs and benefits of an agency's regulations
25
in the aggregate, it could also be used to directly improve agencies'
incentives. If political officials or courts can enforce positive balances,
then agencies will be influenced by the costs as well as the benefits of
their regulations. Though effective enforcement relies heavily on the
political salience of NBAs, experience with congressional budgetary
rules suggests that political salience alone can do some good.
2 6 In-
deed, congressional budget rules and NBAs reflect the same idea: the
best way to exploit the general public's reactions against bad policies
22 In many cases, nonmonetizable benefits are invoked by the agency against crit-
ics. See Adler& Posner, supra note 5, at 175-76 ("[A]gencies often do not monetize
benefits and do not explicitly compare benefits with costs.").
2s SeePosner, supra note 4, at 1176-77 (citing the appointment power as a means to
ensure that agencies' goals will be to the President's liking).
24 Matthew Adler and I argue that such a requirement might be a sensible way for
mitigating some of the perverse effects of cost-benefit analysis. Matthew D. Adler &
Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1141-42 (2000). The Net Benefit Account might serve the same
purpose, albeit in a more formal and reviewable way, as a discretionary fund.
For this reason, the simplest nonenforced version could be administered not by
the government, but by third parties, who already keep track of agency performance
using "regulatory scorecards" and the like. See, e.g., Robert W. Hahn et al., Assessing
Regulatory Impact Analyses: The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order 12,866, 23
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 859, 864 (2000) (using a "regulatory scorecard" to assess the
impact of Regulatory Impact Analysis). Still, official tracking of agency NBAs by a gov-
ernment agency such as the GAO would likely raise the political importance of these
accounts.
26 See Elizabeth Garrett, Harnessing Politics: The Dynamics of Offset Requirements in the
Tax Legislative Process, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 501, 504 (1998) (arguing that budget rules
"are a mechanism to harness the interest group activity that is already ubiquitous in the
tax legislative arena in order to reach substantive policy goals more easily").
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is to channel them. If the public gets upset at bad outcomes (budget
deficits, bad regulations), elected officials have an incentive to enter
agreements intended to avoid these outcomes (budget rules, NBAs).
These agreements can be designed to give officials more refined in-
centives (both rewards and punishments tied to performance) than
those provided by the often inchoate and largely negative public re-
sponse.
III. SOME COMPLICATIONS
A. Actual Versus Estimated Costs and Benefits
I have assumed thus far that an agency's NBA will be adjusted only
when the agency issues a final regulation. The account balance could,
in addition, be subsequently adjusted if the cost-benefit estimates turn
out to be false. Suppose, for example, that an agency's audited esti-
mated net benefits for regulation X are 20, but that subsequent re-
search shows that the actual net benefits were only 15. A hearing
could validate the subsequent research and result in the subtraction of
5 from the account. Alternatively, the NBA could be left unadjusted
when the regulation is issued and adjusted only as the costs and bene-
fits of the regulation become clear, perhaps on an annual basis. Un-
der such an annual adjustment program, if the regulation produces
net benefits of 5 the first year, the account balance would be increased
accordingly at the end of the year; if the regulation then produces net
benefits of -10 the second year, the balance would be reduced; and so
forth.
Research suggests that there is a general bias against regulation
resulting from the fact that agencies often overestimate the costs of a
regulation because of underestimates of the ability of industry to de-
27velop new technologies. Using actual, rather than estimated, costs
would correct this bias against regulation, at least in the aggregate
over time, though certain accounting adjustments would need to be
made in order to avoid a prejudice against regulations that produce
costs earlier than benefits. 28 Using actual costs would also allow agen-
27 See WINSTON HARRINGTON ET AL., ON THE AcCURACY OF REGULATORY COST
ESTIMATES 23 (Res. for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 99-18, Jan. 1999) ("We find
numerous instances in the case studies where actual compliance costs are lower than
predicted costs because of unanticipated use of new technology."), http://
www.rff.org/disc papers/pdf files/9918.pdf.
28 For example, an agency with an NBA of 0 would not be able to issue a regula-
tion that has costs of 5 this year and benefits of 10 next year; accounting devices could
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cies to take advantage of their built-up expertise, enabling agency offi-
cials to rely on intuitions rather than studies, with the reward or pen-
alty arriving as data on the actual costs and benefits finally arrive. In
general, though, the NBA system would present accounting chal-
lenges similar to those presented by regulatory budgets; the literature
on regulatory budgets is a fruitful source of ideas for meeting these
challenges, if indeed they can be met.2
B. Electoral Cycles and Turnover
A low NBA account constrains agencies by preventing them from
implementing regulations that are marginal from a cost-benefit per-
spective, but close to the agency's sense of mission. But, as mentioned
above, if you endow an agency with a surplus in its NBA-say, 100-at
its inception, it might draw down that surplus to 0 by the time that its
political appointees have left office at the next election. Indeed, even
if you do not, agency leaders will be tempted in their last years to draw
down the surplus they generated through good regulation in their
early years. It is not clear that this is a good thing; the agency will tend
to overregulate against the interest of its successors.
This problem is important, but its magnitude should not be exag-
gerated. Law, tradition, and the ideological commitments of those
who are drawn to work for the agency constrain the freedom of tem-
porary political chiefs. The NBA system will work best if the NBA be-
comes a measure of the quality of the agency to the outside world.
Employees will then resist the efforts of agency heads to draw down
the NBA for political reasons, just as they already resist the efforts of
agency heads to lead the agency away from its traditional mission.
C. Regulation Through Adjudication and Other Alternative Instruments
Another danger posed by the NBA system is that agencies will sub-
stitute to alternative forms of regulation that cannot be so easily con-
trolled. For example, an agency might seek to regulate, not by issuing
rules, but by litigating against firms and seeking internal adjudicative
rulings or consent decrees from courts. Agencies might also issue, in-
stead of rules, nonbinding guidelines in the hope that courts would
use them to set standards of care in private litigation.
These problems, however, apply to the cost-benefit executive or-
be used to overcome this problem.
29 LITAN & NORDHAUS, supra note 7, at 146-47.
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ders as well, and they are not more severe for the NBA system. In ad-
dition, agencies are constrained in various ways by the relative useful-
ness of alternative policy instruments. Finally, it might be possible to
take account of these alternative instruments in the NBA system itself,
by, for example, providing that their net benefits (or costs)-deter-
mined by private or GAO studies-be added to (subtracted from) the
agency's NBA. An ambitious, but possibly unworkable, form of the
NBA system would account for all the costs and benefits flowing from
an agency's actions-whatever policy instrument it uses-so that a
running tally would be kept of the agency's effect on social welfare.
D. Net Benefit Accounts Versus External Cost Accounts
(or Regulatory Budgets)
An alternative to the NBA would be to give agencies External Cost
Accounts, which would set a limit on how much cost the agency can
impose on society through its regulations, but which would not be re-
plenished from the benefits. Just such a proposal-under the rubric
of "regulatory budget"-was made twenty years ago by Christopher
DeMuth, Robert Litan, William Nordhaus, and others.3° Despite some
initial excitement, it has had little influence.
One reason for its lack of influence is the inherent difficulty of
implementing the proper accounting procedures. If these difficulties
are indeed insurmountable, then the NBA would be a bad idea as
well. NBAs require all the information about costs that regulatory
budgets require, plus information about benefits, which if anything is
even harder to acquire than information about costs. Nonetheless, if
cost-benefit analysis is a viable decision procedure-which is the
premise of this paper-these problems are in principle surmountable.
NBAs are superior to regulatory budgets for two reasons. First,
because regulatory budgets do not, as an accounting matter, incorpo-
rate the benefits of the regulation, they do not measure the social
value of the regulation. This obscures the normative basis for impos-
ing a regulatory budget. As critics have pointed out, 1 a regulatory
budget prevents an agency from issuing a regulation whenever the
regulation's costs would deplete the budget, regardless of whether the
30 See supra note 7 (citing sources).
31 See Sidney A. Shapiro, Political Oversight and the Deterioration of Regulatoy Policy, 46
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 34 (1994) (summarizing the disadvantages of the regulatory
budget).
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regulation's benefits exceed its costs. 32
Second, regulatory budgets come with crude sanctioning mecha-
nisms: a stick but no carrot, or at least not the right kind of carrot.
Agencies would be prevented from regulating when a new regulation
would break the regulatory budget. 3 That's the stick. But agencies
receive no benefit when they produce highly valuable regulations. In-
stead, the agency can benefit only by issuing a low-cost regulation.
Consider the choice between regulation R, which produces benefits of
100 and costs of 80, and regulation S, which produces benefits of 60
and costs of 50. Although R is better than S, the regulatory budget
encourages the agency to choose S over R, because S produces lower
costs; the NBA encourages the agency to choose R over S, because R
pioduces greater net benefits. The problem with regulatory budgets,
then, is that they reward agencies only for minimizing regulatory costs
when we want to reward agencies for maximizing net benefits.
CONCLUSION
NBAs will not appeal to critics of quantification, 4 but for those
people who think that cost-benefit principles provide adequate guid-
ance for agencies and are frustrated by agencies' resistance to this de-
cision procedure, NBAs are worth consideration. They would gener-
ate better information about regulations than the current cost-benefit
executive orders do. In addition, they might make agency perform-
ance a more politically salient issue, providing elected officials with
new mechanisms for disciplining agencies. Most important, if NBAs
tie an agency's incentives to its performance-by rewarding agencies
either with prestige or flexibility when they issue socially valuable
regulations-they mitigate the moral hazard problem characteristic of
.3 Christopher DeMuth says that benefits are taken into account ex ante when the
regulatory budget is calculated, but he does not explain how this would work, or why it
would be superior to accounting for benefits directly. DeMuth, Regulatory II, supra note
7, at 32-34. Indeed, his claim is puzzling because the reason he gives for rejecting the
latter strategy-namely, the difficulty of calculating benefits-applies as well to the
regulatory budget proposal.33
Robert Litan and William Nordhaus do not clearly explain how sanctioning
would work, and they do not in fact endorse such an extreme approach. See LITAN &
NORDHAUS, supra note 7, at 154-56 (providing an overview of different types of sanc-
tions and problems that inevitably arise from sanctioning).
34 See Frank Ackerman & Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis
of Environmental Protection, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1553, 1553 (2002) (describing cost-
benefit analysis with respect to environmental standards as "a little cold" and "a little
crazy").
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principal-agent relationships.
NBAs do pose problems, but they should not be exaggerated. The
NBA system would require agencies to generate a great deal of infor-
mation, but the cost-benefit executive orders already do that. What is
new is how this information is used. Difficulties in choosing the ap-
propriate accounting procedures, including those that would prevent
gaming by agencies, would need to be addressed, and the literature
on regulatory budgets suggests that this would not be an easy task.
But as accountants know, business accounting is also a very crude pro-
cess, one that is vulnerable to gaming, as the Enron bankruptcy illus-
trates, but one that is still quite useful for shedding light on the finan-
cial health of firms. Finally, it is not clear how effective the NBA
system's sanctioning devices would be in practice. At the least, Con-
gress would need to avoid meddling with NBAs except when there is a
good reason. One might doubt whether Congress can be expected to
restrain itself, but there might be grounds for optimism in Congress's
experience with its own budgetary procedures.
In the end, all I am arguing is that the accounting methods used
to evaluate agency performance should be brought up to date and put
on par with the accounting methods used for businesses, with the
hope that as better information becomes available, the political proc-
ess will kick in and supply the needed discipline. The NBA system
could be a first step in this complex process.
